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SLIDING TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES:
A NEW REMEDY FOR, HIGH-STAKES EDUCATION
LAWSUITS IN A POST-NCLB WORLD
Christopher A. Suarez*
Sheff v. O'Neill ushered in a new wave of education refonn litigation that may
ctallenge the constitutionality of de facto segregation under state education clauses,
but its remedy has been inadequate. Ttis Note proposes a neu' desegregation
remedy-the sliding scale remedy-to address socioeconomic isolation in this unique
constitutional context. The remedy employs varying degrees of equity power
depending on students' academic outcomes. It balances concerns over local control
and separation of powers with the court's need to effectuate rights, e tablishes a clear
remedial principle, and ensures that states and sctool districts focus on students as
they implement remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
After over fifty years of litigation meant to correct instances of de
jure segregation, the rise of de facto segregation has rendered the legacy
of Brown' all but meaningless. In 1996, however, a new frontier opened up
in the battle for educational equity. For the first time, a court ruled that de
facto segregation could violate a state constitution's education clause. The
Connecticut Supreme Court held in its historic Sheff v. O'Neill decision
that extensive levels of ethnic and racial isolation in Hartford's public
schools unconstitutionally deprived students of substantially equal educa-
tional opportunities.3 Although the state constitution entitled the plaintiffs
to relief, the court politely punted the sticky issue, "afford[ing] the legisla-
ture, with the assistance of the executive branch, the opportunity, in the
first instance, to fashion the remedy that will most appropriately respond
to the constitutional violations that we have identified."' This raises a key
question: will Sheff fulfill its constitutional legacy, or will it simply be a
Brown II d&jA vu?5
Thirteen years after the Sheff ruling, little has changed in Hartford.
Hartford's low-income and minority schoolchildren continue to struggle
academically; the number of children attending schools with reduced lev-
els of racial and economic isolation is far below plaintiffs' current 2013
goal;" and the state legislature has never mandated that any of Hartford's
surrounding towns take action. All remedial efforts thus far have been
voluntary, and the state has not taken full responsibility for its students'
educational outcomes.7
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that de jure segregation of
students in schools is unconstitutional and that separate is inherently unequal).
2. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
3. Id.
4. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271.
5. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that district courts
needed to act with "all deliberate speed" to effectuate the Brown ruling).
6. See infra Part II.
7. Cf William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in an Era of Stan-
dards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 301 (2001) (arguing that student and
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Connecticut is not alone." Throughout the country, a "reluctance to
utilize fully the courts' inherent institutional strengths" has resulted in a
"mixed record of success in both federal and state institutional reform
litigations."' Although the Slieff plaintiffs and their attorneys have "vowed
to continue their legislative efforts to force greater changes in the racial
and economic segregation of Connecticut's schoolchildren,"" this will-
power has not been enough.These problems need new remedies."
When Sheff was decided in 1996, the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB) was five years away from passage.'- Although some states had
made preliminary efforts to measure the educational outcomes of their
students through standardized tests, there was not a nationwide push for
accountability." Back then, the tests were not "high-stakes" and states felt
no meaningful pressure to adopt them."
Today, however, we live in a world of standards-based accountability.
All states currently provide tests to gauge the academic progress of their
students," and these tests provide data that informs both public policy and
school accountability to the state is not enough and that states and schools should be held
similarly accountable to students, parents, and communities).
8. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006); Campaign for Fiscal Equity
v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006). In these school funding lawsuits, the high court in
each state deferred to their respective legislatures to prescribe remedies.
9. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, The Remedies Proble, Posed by Sheff v.
O'Neill-and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1144 (1997).
10. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY 170 (2001).
11. As one commentator recently noted, "[w]e need to rethink the kinds of remedies
that might work in the education context." Adam Shinar, School Finance Lig~ation: A Never-
ending Play LAW AND EDUCATION BLOc, Oct. 29, 2009, available at http://lawandeducation.
wordpress.com/2009/10/29/school-finance-litigation-a-neverending-play/.
12. See The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002).
13. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES,
AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 72 (2009) (graphically demonstrating the gradual increase in state accountability
systems from 1993 onward).
14. Cf Michael Heise, Adequacy Litigation in an Era ofAccountability, SCHOOL. MONEY
TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 262, 267 (2007) ("When many
states initiated efforts to articulate desired student academic proficiency in the early- and
mid-1980s they did so without the specter of federal liability under NCLB or exposure to
adequacy lawsuits.").
15. Cf Andrew Rudalevige, Adequacy, Accountability, and the Impact of the No Child
Left Behind Act, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS:THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY
243, 248 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (noting that NCLB is about
measuring results and that NCLB's forerunner, the Improving America's Schools Act, was
executed far more slowly at the state level than NCLB).
16. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. HEss & MICHAEL J. PETRILLI, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 31
(Peter Lang Primer ed., 2006) (highlighting that NCLB requires all states to create aca-
demic standards and devise tests that assess those standards).
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the law.' 7 While many scholars have criticized the accuracy and legitimacy
of standardized tests, and NCLB has flaws that I will not thoroughly dis-
cuss here,'8 standardized testing provides courts with a tool to ensure
educational accountability.
Even in this post-NCLB world, however, the current incarnation of
the Sheff remedy does not focus on educational outcomes-the best
proxy for educational opportunity'-at all. Instead, it provides benchmark
targets that attempt to minimize the racial, ethnic, and economic isolation
of Connecticut students.2 ' Thus, the remedy has focused on the means
and not the desired ends of the litigation.2 ' This has been a similar prob-
lem in school finance lawsuits, where court remedies have focused on
17. See Heise, supra note 14, at 267 (noting that NCLB obligates all states to partici-
pate in the National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP) to receive federal funds,
and that this mandate provides a check against state efforts to lower state-level standards).
18. The most significant flaw in NCLB for the purposes of this Note is the fact that
it allows states significant flexibility to choose their own testing and accountability mecha-
nisms. See HEss, supra note 16, at 31-32.The problem with this is that it has created a "race
to the bottom" in which some states have lowered their academic standards to meet aca-
demic requirements. See Marissa Silber, A Response to Failed Iipleientation: Why No Child
Left Behind Has Not Been Reauthorized, prepared for the Midwest Political Science Associa-
tion (Apr. 2009), at 22-23. If states employ such tactics, it may undermine the usefulness of
the remedy proposed in this Note unless NCLB is strengthened such that state standards
are normed against a uniform, national standard (such as those assessed in the NAEP).
19. See infra Part I. There is significant debate on the question of whether or not
equal educational opportunities are the same as equal educational outcomes. Although
some definitions of equal educational opportunity focus on equality of inputs to the edu-
cational system (labor, equipment, capital), "[miore recently, attention is turning to outputs
(e.g., what schools produce, such as types of achievement and graduates) and outcomes
(e.g., lifetime accomplishments, such as earnings or health status) that are variously related
to what schools do." See Robert Berne & Leana Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Adequacy:
1970 to the Present, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EnucATiON FINANCE: ISSUES AND PER-
SPECTIVES 11-12 (Helen F Ladd et al. eds., 1999). Courts have also recognized the
connection between equal educational opportunity and student outcomes. In a New Jer-
sey school finance case, the court "sought to equalize not money, but achievement." REED,
supra note 10, at 84-85.
20. See Stipulation and Order, Sheff v. O'Neill, No. X03-89-0492119S (New Brit-
ain Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Phase I Stipulation] (providing a timetable for
reducing racial, ethnic, and economic isolation so that at least 30 percent of minority stu-
dents in Hartford will be in less isolated conditions by 2007); see also Stipulation and
Proposed Order, Sheff v. O'Neill, No. HHD-X07-CV89-4026240-S (Hartford Sup. Ct.
April 4, 2008) [hereinafter Phase II Stipulation] (noting that the phase I settlement goal
was not met and increasing the goal of reduced isolation to 41 percent of Hartford stu-
dents by 2013).
21. Eric Hanushek, a frequent critic of school finance litigation, argues that "[t]he
ultimate objective of an adequacy remedy is to help children, who are the focus of the
case because either their schools lack resources or their achievement is unacceptable." HA-
NUSHEK, supra note 13, at 145. Resources provided to school districts as a result of court
victories are merely means to the end of providing better education to kids. Id.
[VOL. 15:477
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specific funding levels.2 - In addition to sidetracking the courts' remedial
focus on educational outcomes, these means-focused remedies exacerbate
separation of powers concerns as they force courts to search for the
"right" amounts of funding or the "right" racial and socioeconomic bal-
ance of students.2 ' As I argue in this Note, an effective remedy in any
school litigation case must be as ends-focused-through the use of
student performance on standardized tests, for example-as it is means-
focused.24
One of the political challenges of the Sheff ruling is that it is prem-
ised on the assumption that quality, integrated schools will promote
academic achievement among all students. Many scholars have found this
to be true.2' However, many Connecticut citizens-and particularly
suburban parents-do not believe that an infusion of low-income, minor-
ity children into their school districts will promote the academic
achievement of their children.' Thus, an effective remedy should focus on
the achievement of suburban students as much as it focuses on the
achievement of disadvantaged urban students. From a constitutional
standpoint, moreover, effective remedies should ensure the academic
achievement of all students. This is the only way to ensure that remedies
will be both politically and legally tenable.
Using Sheff as a case study, this Note proposes a new remedial
framework for courts facing education reform lawsuits. I call this frame-
work the sliding scale remedy 7 The framework acknowledges that state
legislatures and executive actors should initially be empowered to design
their own remedies, 28 but it also structures threats to use equity power
when constitutional standards are not met.2' These threats are grounded in
22. See Robynn K. Sturm & Julia A. Simon-Kerr, Justiciability and the Role of Courts
in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, at 29-31 (2008), avail-
able at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1078&context =
studentpapers.
23. See id.
24. Cf Koski, supra note 7, at 315 (concluding that courts should craft remedies that
"promise to improve schools and the teaching and learning that goes on inside those
schools").
25. See discussion itfra Part IV.C. This parallels an assumption in school funding
litigation-in particular, the assumption that "money matters."
26. See, e.g., KATHRYN MCDERMOTT, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM
VERSUS EQUITY 28 (1999) (noting that parents in New Haven's surrounding suburbs were
concerned about the "contagion from New Haven" spreading to their districts).
27. For a basic overview of the sliding scale remedy, see infra Part lI.A.
28. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 22 (discussing how separation of powers concerns
have threatened to drive state courts out of education reform lawsuits due to threats of
funding-focused remedies).
29. But see the Texas Edg'ewvood litigation, in which the court's injunctive threat was
not graduated. Rather, it was a simple threat to shut down the entire public school system.
Id. at 43. This threat was never carried out despite the court's determination that the
school system was inadequate on three separate occasions. Id.
SPRING 2010]
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a clear remedial principle-academic outcomes. 3' Although the remedy
discussed in this Note is specific to efforts that seek to improve academic
outcomes through ethnic and socioeconomic integration, the principles
behind the remedy can apply to all forms of education litigation.3
Regardless, some have argued that the future of education lawsuits
will eventually be patterned after Sheff. 2 In particular, "Slieff could inspire
similar lawsuits against other states in which districts are segregated into
rich and poor, but have been exempt from desegregation litigation due to
there being no history of de jure segregation."*" At least twenty-eight
states have acknowledged that the right to an "adequate" or "equitable"
education exists in their states, making those states potential breeding
grounds for future Sheff-like suits. 4 In fact, two such suits have concluded
since the filing of the initial Sieff complaint.3' A recent study of education
adequacy litigation, moreover, argues that separation of powers concerns
may be stemming the tide of adequacy litigation challenges which pri-
marily emphasize resources and funding.3 Although challenges to school
30. Academic outcomes, in fact, were one of the primary concerns of the Sheff
plaintiffs. See Sheff Plaintiffs' Statenieut of Principles (Sept. 1996) (on file with author).
The plan must include an accountability system for monitoring implementation of
the Sheff remedy that assesses efforts, inputs and results, including the academic expecta-
tions, commitment to excellence and sensitivity of staff, but ultimately measures the
purpose of the remed--school quality and school integration-by student perforlnance in aca-
deinic competence and social attitudes. (emphasis added). Id.
31. See infra Part ll.C. (addressing how the sliding scale remedy could apply within
the school finance context).
32. See Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston Ill, A Re-Analysis of the Legal Political,
and Social Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in Comrnu-
nity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,218 B.YU. ED. & L.J. 217, 249-50 (2007); see
also RICiiARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETIER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS
TriROUGI PUBLIC SC1OOL CHOICE 171 (2001) (arguing that the Sheff ruling is a highly
relevant precedent for the economic segregation argument because it departs from the de
jure segregation requirements of racial segregation challenges); Molly S. McUsic, The Fu-
ture of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 1334, 1365 (2004) (arguing that one of the most promising legal avenues to attain
economic integration will be through the use of modified school integration remedies);
See Janies E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308-09 (1999) (noting that
school "finance" plaintiffs should consider arguing for socioeconomic or racial integration,
or both).
33. Caldas, supra note 32, at 249.
34. National Access Network, "Equity" and "Adequacy" School Funding Court Decisions
(June 2008), available at http://www.schoolfinding.info/fltigation/equityandadequacytable.pdf.
35. See Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs had
failed to state a claim under the state constitution's education article when arguing that
poverty and minority concentration deprived plaintiffs of adequate educational opportu-
nity). In NAACP v. State, a Minneapolis case, the parties reached a settlement agreement
calling for an inter-district transfer plan to relieve racial and economic isolation. Minneapo-
lis Branch of the NAACP v. State, No. 95-014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995).
36. See Sturm, supra note 22.
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funding systems likely will continue for the foreseeable future, 7 the study
argued that "plaintiffs must find a way to recharacterize both the right and
the remedy so that they cannot be boiled down to a demand for increased
funding., 38 Assuming that Sheff-like lawsuits become the wave of the fu-
ture, the use of sliding scale remedies will become increasingly relevant.
This Note proceeds as follows. In Part I1, the current Sheff remedy is
discussed in detail. Part III introduces the sliding scale remedy proposed in
this Note. Part IV then addresses several challenges that opponents of the
sliding scale remedy could raise. These challenges include the remedy's
effect on local control of school districts, issues of White flight that may
result from the remedy's implementation, the validity of the "harm and
benefit" thesis that posits that desegregated schools promote academic
outcomes, and federal legal challenges to the remedy from cases such as
Milliken and Parents Inolved. Part V discusses several unique advantages of
the sliding scale remedy-the remedy establishes a clear remedial princi-
ple for future courts, maximizes the use of the court's agenda-setting
power, and re-centers the focus of the court remedy on students as it re-
duces moral hazard problems both within school districts and the state.
I.THE REMEDY IN THE SHEFF CASE
The Sheff litigation arose in response to a climate of severe inequity
in Connecticut. In 1988, a committee appointed by Connecticut's educa-
tion commissioner released A Report on Racial/Ethnic Equity and
Desegregation in Connecticut's Public Schools 9.3 This report noted that "two
Connecticuts" had emerged-one that boasted the highest per capita in-
come in the United States yet contained two of its top ten poorest cities. 
4
0
In response to this report, a citizens' group called the Connecticut
37. Recent cases decided by state supreme courts indicate that school funding chal-
lenges remain relevant in state constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Lobato v. State, 218
P.3d 358, 370 (Colo. 2009) No. 08SC 185 (Co. Oct. 19, 2009), (holding that plaintiffs may
challenge the constitutionality of the state's school funding system). The Lobato court spe-
cifically noted that "[i]mportant differences exist between federal and state constitutional
law on judicial power and the separation of powers." Id. at 29. Another school funding
challenge, in fact, was recently decided in the Connecticut Supreme Court. Connecticut
Coalition for Justice in Educ. Funding v. Rell, No. 18032 (Conn. Mar. 30,2010) (holding that a
right to both an equitable and "suitable" education exists in the Connecticut constitution
and that plaintiffs are entitled to challenge a school funding system to the extent that it
does not protect those rights).
38. Sturm, supra note 22, at 51-52. Socioeconomic integration is suggested as one
such non-monetary remedy. Id. at 52.
39. CHRISTOPHER COLLIER, CONNECTICUT'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A HISTORY, 1650-
2000, 635 (2009).
40. Id.
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Coalition for Educational Equity emerged and plaintiffs banded together
to file the Sheff lawsuit.'
The plaintiffs' complaint emphasized the negative impact segregated
conditions could have on all children-Black, White, or Hispanic. The
complaint underscored the negative impact of racial isolation, localized
and concentrated poverty, and lack of academic attainment on children
throughout the Hartford region.' Indeed, plaintiffs from the more afflu-
ent town of East Hartford were also represented because, as the complaint
noted, "the racial, ethnic, and economic isolation of Hartford metropoli-
tan school districts [deprives those children] of the opportunity to
associate with, and learn from, the minority children attending school in
the Hartford school district. 4 3 The Connecticut Supreme Court ulti-
mately agreed that these conditions violated the Connecticut
Constitution.The Court held that, since "the state has an affirmative obli-
gation to monitor and to equalize educational opportunity,4 4 the state's
awareness of existing and increasing severe racial and ethnic isolation im-
poses upon the state the responsibility to remedy 'segregation ... because
of race [or] ... ancestry....,41
As previously noted, however, the Sheff majority deferred entirely to
the state legislature to construct a remedy.4' In response, the Connecticut
General Assembly produced a remedy that emphasizes voluntary school
choice between Hartford and its surrounding school districts. The legisla-
tion was codified in Public Act 97-290, v and has since been
supplemented by two settlement agreements.4 " The original legislation
provided for a "state-wide inter-district public school attendance pro-
gram, which would later be called the Open Choice program. This
program allows students from Hartford to attend suburban schools on a
space-available basis. The legislation also called for the creation of other
programs such as inter-district magnet schools and other after-school and
weekend programs that allow students to attend schools that are less eth-
nically and racially isolated. "' Although Theodore Sergi, the commissioner
41. Id. at 636.
42. Id. at 640.
43. Wesley W Worton, John Brittain et al., Complaint in Sheff v. O'Neill, EQuITY &
EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., Spring 1994, at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
44. In Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1966), the Connecticut Supreme
Court first expressed that a right to an equitable education exists under the Connecticut
Constitution.
45. Sheff 678 A.2d at 1282-83 (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 1271.
47. An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and Opportunities, Pub. Act No. 97-
290, 1997 Conn. Acts 1113 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered sections at
Conn. Gen. Stat. 5 10-4 et seq. (2009)).
48. See Phase I Stipulation, supra note 20; Phase I I Stipulation, supra note 20.
49. 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-290 § 3(b).
50. 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-290 § 2(a).
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of education, noted that "[i]t would be bad public policy ... to forget
about our responsibility for students learning how to read, write, and
compute as we worry about the responsibility [for promoting racial and
ethnic integration]," s' the legislation does not enumerate specific aca-
52
demic outcomes or integration requirements that must be met.
The programs proposed in the legislation were limited in scope, and
initial commentary predicted that they would not reach enough stu-
dents . These predictions remain valid. Although the Connecticut State
Department of Education recently noted that progress has been made on
the Sheff mandate-roughly twenty-seven percent of Hartford's students
now attend school in a racially diverse settings 4-most of these students
are attending magnet schools.)5 This would not be a problem if magnet
schools could provide a sustainable solution to the problem, but they can-
not." ' Under the current Sheff agreement, at least 41% of Hartford
students must be in racially diverse settings by 2013 . A Connecticut
judge recently held that the state is not in breach of the settlement, 8 but
the Sheff plaintiffs have alleged that the state's calculations to gauge com-
pliance are invalid.'9
51. Rick Green, Adamant Defense Livens Up Sheff Case; Commnissioner Says State is
Complying, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 19, 1998, at Al.
52. But see 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-290 § 3(b) (listing improved academic achieve-
ment among the purposes of the program created under the legislative remedy).
53. According to McDermott, for example, the settlement would only affect "about
one thousand students out of a total of five hundred thousand statewide." McDERMOTT,
supra note 26, at 48. Although the focus of the lawsuit is on Hartford and not the entire
state, this still represents a low proportion of Hartford's student population.
54. Grace E. Merritt, State Says City Making Strides, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 19,
2001, at B3.
55. See id. (stating that 3,200 of 5,200 minority students being educated in racially
diverse settings are attending magnet schools).
56. Several prominent individuals have expressed this concern. Linda Schofield, a
Connecticut state representative, notes that the magnet solution represents a "path of the
least bang for the biggest buck," and that Open Choice should be more thoroughly
funded. Linda Schofield, Op-Ed, No Neu, Need For Magnet Schools: Why Not Fill Empty
Seats in Suburban Schools First?, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 7, 2010, at Cl. Elizabeth Feser,
Windsor's current superintendent, notes that she has begun to become "disillusioned with
magnet schools as a solution for Sheff." Robert A. Frahm, Reality Thwarts Theory in Desegre-
gation Campaign, CoNN. MIRROR, Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://www.ctmirror.org/
story/reality-thwarts-theory-desegregation-campaign. Philip Tegeler, staff coordinator for
the Sheff movement, has highlighted the fact that there are long waiting lists for children
to get into the magnet schools and that "[t]here is a pressing need to expand the open
choice program." Grace E. Merritt,Judge Rejects Sheff Plaintiffs' Claim, HARTFORD CouRANT,
Feb. 26, 2010, at B6.
57. See Phase H Stipulation, supra note 20, § ll.C.4 (noting that a material breach of
the settlement will not occur if the 41% goal is met by 2013).
58. See Merritt, supra note 56.
59. Id.
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In the long run, more use of Open Choice would therefore be ap-
propriate. But over the past several years, only between 1,500 and 2,000
students have been served by the Open Choice program.' Growth of this
program has remained stagnant due to the "lack of seats offered by subur-
ban districts and the inadequacy of support services for students and
teachers involved in the program""' The state, moreover, fails to provide
adequate funding to the suburbs who accept Hartford students into their
districts. 2
This has created a lot of tension. In the fall of 2009, Hartford's su-
perintendent of schools stated that he was "frustrated" by the lack of state
and regional comnitment for implementation of the racial-equity provi-
sions in the Sheff settlement.' Although a lot of "lip service" has been
paid, he noted that little is being done outside of Hartford to assist in the
remedy's implementation. "'4 This has even been true with the magnets.
After a long battle with the state '-including a threat by Hartford to can-
cel all transportation to the iiiagnets"-the state legislature finally
appropriated the funds necessary to bus and educate Hartford's magnet
students for the 2009-10 school year.
To the extent that magnets have been supported by the state, they
have allowed students to attain academic success."6" For example, The Met-
ropolitan Learning Center-a global-studies themed magnet school-
reports that 98-100% of its students say that they will go on to college
60. See Connecticut State Board of Education, District Efforts to Reduce Racial, Ethnic
and Econonic Isolation in 2004-2006, February 2007. The program also allows suburban
students to attend schools in a nearby urban center. Id. There are currently about 1,200
Hartford students in the Open Choice program. Merritt, supra note 56.
61. Id. at 10.
62. "Unfortunately, suburban public schools have historically limited the number of
Hartford children they are willing to take through the Open Choice program, because
they are paid so little by the state for each child they take. Simsbury, for example, gets
$3,040 per student, while the average cost to educate a student in Simsbury is $12,181."
Schofield, supra note 56.
63. Steven Goode, School Chief Lands Gains: Adanlowski Cites Progress, Challenges,
HARTFORD CouRANr, Oct. 15, 2009, at A3.
64. Id.
65. Jeffrey B. Cohen, Hartford Receives Less Than Requested $12,000 for Each Suburban
Student, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 3, 2009, at A2 (noting that the State Senate's appropria-
tion of $12,000 was $1,054 short of Hartford's request and that Hartford had made efforts
to rally parents to ensure that the state would appropriate additional funds).
66. Steven Goode, Magnet Transport Contract at Risk, HARTFORD COUtRANT, Nov. 17,
2009, at B 1.
67. Steven Goode, State Funds Magnet Transportation, HARTFORD CITYLINE, Nov. 18,
2009, available at http://blogs.courant.com/cityline/2009/1 1/state-funds-magnet-school-
tran.html.
68. As of 2007, approximately 15,000 students were attending interdistrict magnet
schools in the Sheff region. Connecticut State Board of Education, supra note 60, at 3.
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after graduation. 6 The Montessori Magnet School, meanwhile, has met
adequate yearly progress"' (AYP) seven of the past eight school years."
However, only sixteen percent of Hartford's students are able to attend its12
twenty inter-district magnet schools. Two of these schools, moreover, are
not meeting the racial diversity goals of Sheff
73
Overall, therefore, the results of the voluntary remedies have been
disappointing. First, participation in inter-district magnet and Open
Choice programs have fallen short of goals established by the litigants.
74
More importantly, the academic outcomes of students in Hartford con-
tinue to lag behind the rest of the region well after the Sheff remedy was
implemented. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the academic progress of Hart-
ford students in relation to three of its surrounding districts in the Sheff
region over the past three years (using state-reported data).
69. See Anita Wadhwa, Crossing the Line & Closing the Gap: Interdistrict Magnet Schools
as Remedies for Segregation, Concentrated Poverty and Inequality 5 (Charles Hamilton Houston
Inst. For Race and Justice at Harvard Law Sch., Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://www.charleshaniiltonhouston.org/assets/documents/publications/Wadhwa-Crossi
ngtheLine.pdf.
70. Adequate Yearly Progress refers to the percentage of the children that must score
"proficient" on state math and reading assessments in a given year. See Hess, supra note 16,
at 33-34.The state sets this bar and must raise it to 100% by 2013-14 under the No Child
Left Behind Act. Id. at 34.
71. Wadhwa, supra note 69, at 7.
72. Connecticut State Board of Education, siipra note 60, at 9. In addition, only
eighteen percent of New Haven's students are able to attend its twenty inter-district mag-
net schools. Id. Although New Haven was not explicitly part of the Sheff litigation, its
plight is relevant because the legislative remedy was intended to address the problem of
racial and economic isolation throughout the state since, presumably, similar conditions to
those in Hartford could be declared unconstitutional under the Sheff precedent.
73. See Robert A. Frahm, Reality Tnvarts Theory in Desegregation Campaign, CT MIR-
ROR, Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://www.ctmirror.org/story/reality-thwarts-theory-
desegregation-campaign. These two schools are Capital Prep and Pathways to Technology.
At Capital Prep, ninety percent of the students are members of minority groups. However,
students there "do perform well on statewide tests and routinely graduate and go on to
four-year colleges." Id.
74. See Phase i Stipulation, supra note 20 (noting that the goals set forth by the
Phase I Stipulation were not met as of the date of its expiration).
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TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE NCLB PROFICIENCY OF ELEMENTARY STUDENTS
Connecticut Mastery Test Results (Grade 4)
Math Reading
Town 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Hartford 42.5 49.9 53.9 28.3 32.6 36.8
West Hartford 89.5 88.9 92.8 80.7 82.3 86.8
Avon 95.1 96.3 94.5 91.4 89.3 92.3
Windsor 75.6 78.9 77.7 66.9 63.4 69.6
*Data gathered from www.cmtreports.coni (last accessed March 8, 2010)
Numbers represent the percentage of students who meet the state proficiency bar
TABLE 2: COMPARATIVE NCLB PROFICIENCY OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
Connecticut Aptitude Performance Test Results (Grade 10)
Math Reading
Town 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Hartford 43.4 46.7 45.4 49.8 52.2 52.6
West Hartford 86.9 88.5 90.8 87.9 91.1 94.4
Avon 96.6 95.6 94.4 95.7 95.6 95.6
Windsor 76.7 79.4 76.6 81.3 74.6 77
*Data gathered from www.captreports.com (last accessed March 8, 2010)
Numbers represent the percentage of students who meet the state proficiency bar
Interestingly, the advent of NCLB and mandated accountability re-
porting came around the same time as the Sheff remedy's adoption. This
presented the opportunity to test the viability of purely voluntary deseg-
regation remedies, and this achievement data indicates that, although some
progress has been made, the voluntary remedies have done little to equal-
ize the educational opportunities between Hartford and its suburbs. 7
It is unsurprising that the voluntary choice experiment has been
unsuccessful. Rather than focusing on students and their achievement, the
remedy has solely focused on minimizing racial and economic isolation
through demographic targets and percentile ranges.' The voluntary na-
ture of Open Choice, moreover, provides suburban districts with few
incentives to accept Hartford students." The sheer creation of inter-
district magnet schools may not be enough, furthermore, given that these
75. The data says nothing about the utility of desegregation as a remedy in general,
however. Only a fraction of Hartford students have been able to participate in Open
Choice and inter-district magnet programs.
76. See Phase II Stipulation, supra note 20.
77. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2068 (2002) (noting that states do not usually oversee capacity issues in
school districts).
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schools may simply be creaming Hartford's top students "off the top. '
Inter-district magnet and choice schools cannot advance the academic
outcomes of students who do not choose to attend those schools.
Theoretically, Public Act 97-290 holds the state accountable for the
academic outcomes of Hartford students. The statute lists academic
achievement as one of its purposes.' The implementation plan required
by the statute must have "appropriate goals and strategies to achieve re-
source equity and equality of opportunity, increase student achievement,
reduce racial, ethnic and economic isolation, improve effective instruction
and encourage greater parental and community involvement in all public
schools of the state."" And the Act further calls on the State Board of
Education to significantly reduce disparities in student achievement over
future years of the implementation plan."' But more could and should be
done to improve the academic outcomes of ethnically and economically
isolated students who reside in Hartford.
II. DEFINING THE SLIDING SCALE REMEDY
While most states have used the NCLB law and testing regime to
enforce school districts' and students' accountability to the states, the slid-
ing scale remedy holds states accountable for the educational results of
students in affected districts. This remedy may be applied to the Con-
necticut context and may also be applied by virtually any state-level court
that wishes to remedy a similar constitutional violation.
A. Overview of the Remedy
The starting point of the sliding scale remedy leverages the agenda-
setting power of courts to encourage the state to undertake voluntary
efforts-both at the executive and legislative level-to address the consti-
tutional violation. Initially, the remedy simply acts as a form of declaratory
relief. If well-defined outcomes are not ultimately met, however, the rem-
edy shifts to progressively stronger forms of injunctive relief.
2
The sliding scale remedy is a flexible remedy that moves along a
continuum. At the left end of the continuum are voluntary remedies
78. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 129 ("Because magnets normally rely on the
motivation of parents to apply-and because balancing is based on race, not class-they
tend to attract middle-class whites and the most advantaged blacks.").
79. 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-290 § 3(b).
80. 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-290 § 4(a) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Cf REED, supra note 10, at 170-71 (arguing that using declaratory relief in con-
junction with the threat of injunctive relief focuses the attention of legislatures in
meaningful ways).
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much like those currently implemented under Sheff-inter-district mag-
net schools and Open Choice programs that aspire to integrate students
from communities of different racial and socioeconomic compositions.
The middle of the continuum entails "compulsory acceptance"-in
which the court may enjoin suburban school districts to accept students
from socioeconomically disadvantaged regions of the community. If nec-
essary, the sliding scale remedy would allow state courts to mandate
creation of a regional school district throughout a greater metropolitan
area.The scope of the remedy is assessed periodically, and the remedy may
shift left or right on the continuum in any given period.
FIGURE 1: SCHOOL DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION CONTINUUM
Inter-district Magnet Schools Creation of Regional
Open Choice Programs Compulsory Acceptance School District
Voluntary Compulsory
Academic outcomes are what ultimately drive movement along this
remedial continuum.When a state court determines that students are de-
prived of adequate educational opportunities-based on either
socioeconomic or ethnic isolation-the court must consistently monitor
those results to gauge the appropriate scope of the remedy."3 If the court
finds disparities in educational opportunities between Hartford and its
suburbs, it has an obligation to use its equity power to reduce those dis-
parities. The easiest way to monitor progress in this area is through test
scores. While the court has an obligation to wield its equity power in
these contexts, however, the remedy also considers the performance of
suburban students-their educational outcomes must not be significantly
diminished as a result of the court's injunctive measures.
B. The Remedial Landscape
This Part briefly outlines four remedial possibilities that may occur
when a court employs the sliding scale remedy. All of the discrete possi-
bilities are dependent on student academic outcomes over the course of a
83. Allowing the remedy to operate based on a growth model with a reasonably
high long-term target is optimal for both the state and the plaintiffs. In Hancock v. Connis-
sioner of Education, 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1153-54 (Mass. 2005), State defendants conceded
that progress towards state proficiency standards is the constitutional standard in Massachu-
setts. See Robert M. Costrell, The Winning Defense in Massachusetts, in SCHOOL MONEY
TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 278, 278-81 (Martin R. West &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
[VOL. 15:477
Sliding Towards Educational Outcomes
remedy's implementation. The court first sets a reasonable, annual growth
target on the state's standardized test (the CMT and CAPT tests for Con-
necticut).84 The court also sets a target proficiency percentage for the
entire region.-' As part of the remedy, the state designates surrounding
school districts as participating districts, much as the state legislature did
under Sheff. 1
84. When I discuss growth targets, I refer to the percentage of students who are
meeting state standards on the relevant state test. The percent of students who meet the
"Proficiency" target is reported to the Federal Government under NCLB to determine
the extent to which the state has met adequate yearly progress (AYP). This could also be
designed as an average raw score (or percentage correct) on the test, so as to ensure that
teachers focus on the achievement of all students.
85. To simplify discussion, I suggest one overarching proficiency target. Of course,
this proficiency target can incorporate performance in different subjects such as reading,
math, and science.
86. JACK DOUGHERTY ET AL., MISSING THE GOAL: A VISUAL GUIDE TO SHEFF VS.
O'NEILL SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3 (2007) (listing the twenty-two towns that comprise
the Sheffregion).
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MAP 1: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE 22-DISTRICT
SHEFF REGION OF METROPOLITAN HARTFORD,
1988-89 (INSET) AND 2006-071
7
87. From JACK DOUGHERTY ET AL., MISSING THE GOAL:AVISUAL GUIDE TO SHEFF VS.
O'NEILL SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 2 (2007) (reprinted with permission).
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FIGURE 2: REMEDIAL POSSIBILITIES BASED ON STUDENT OUTCOMES
Suburban Student Outcomes
+
0
'E
05
-e
Figure Two illustrates the four remedial possibilities in more detail.
8
First, whenever the outcomes of urban students are improving, remedies
are purely voluntary and all districts are free to make adjustments based
on their particularized needs. The court orders injunctive relief, however,
when suburban student outcomes remain above proficiency target levels
either for brief or sustained periods and urban students are not achieving
at adequate levels (bottom-left quadrant). This may lead to compulsory
acceptance requirements or the creation of a regional school district. Fi-
nally, achievement of all students may be inadequate for a sustained period
of time. In these rare instances, the court would declare a crisis situation
and delegate further action back to the state legislature with specific guid-
ance.
The sliding scale remedy provides incentives that will encourage
voluntary compliance by suburban school districts and the state in ways
that will improve educational outcomes for students both inside and out-
side of Hartford." Under the remedy, it will be in the state's best interest
to improve the quality of education within Hartford as it expands options
for voluntary integration." If Hartford's academic outcomes improve
while voluntary remedies are being utilized, Hartford students will be
meeting reasonable, court-mandated AYP targets and suburbs will largely
maintain local autonomy. However, to the extent that the state fails to take
action on its own to encourage greater performance in the Hartford
school district, the court must act to reduce racial and economic isolation
of Hartford's students.
88. When examining the four quadrants in the figure a plus sign means that, in a
given year, either (a) students are currently at or above the court's proficiency target or (b)
students have grown at a proficiency rate at or above the court's growth rate. A minus sign
means that (a) students who are below the court's proficiency target have not grown at the
court's growth rate or that (b) students who were originally above the court's proficiency
target dropped below the proficiency target.
89. See, e.g., iilfra Part IV.B.
90. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
Purely Voluntary Remedy Purely Voluntary Remedy
(Open Choice, Inter-District Magnet (Levels of Participation
Schools, and other Voluntary Initia- by Suburban Districts
tives) Can Be Adjusted)
Sliding-Scale Remedies Apply Crisis Situation
(Compulsory Acceptance (State Takeover and/or Additional
and/or Creation of Legislative Action Should
Regional School District) Be Taken)
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1. PurelyVoluntary Remedy (Urban and Suburban Outcomes Met)
Initially, the remedy focuses on voluntary measures such as inter-
district magnet schools and voluntary choice programs. Open Choice
and inter-district magnet schools would be offered in the metropolitan
area, and suburbs would have the option to accept students from Hart-
ford and send their students to inter-district magnet schools. Districts
may take any additional voluntary steps that serve the purpose of im-
proving achievement of students in the region and reducing racial and
economic isolation.
As the program unfolds, the court gauges the academic performance
of the racially and economically isolated region (in this case, Hartford)
and compares it to the growth goal stipulated by the court. This assess-
ment is done in relation to a baseline that is calculated in year one. In the
hypothetical scenario presented in Figure 3, the growth goal has been set
at 5%."' In each year that Hartford meets its growth goal, the court will not
apply additional equity power and the remedy will continue to be en-
tirely voluntary.
FIGURE 3: HYPOTHETICAL WHERE PURELY VOLUNTARY
PROGRAMS WOULD BE ALLOWED92
Growth Goal = 5% Target = 80% Proficiency in Both Reading and Math
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
]Suburbansurban 80% 82% 78% 81% 80% 82% 84% 82% 85%
District ____ ____ ___ ___ ___
Hartford 53% 59% 63% 68% 73% 78% 80% 81% 81%
Proceed- Proceed- Proceed-
Court Baseline Proceed Warning Proceed Proceed Proceed at or at or at or
Action Above Goal Above Goal Above Goal
Note that, as Figure Three illustrates, Hartford's testing outcomes
generally meet or exceed the growth goal. It is only between years two
and three that Hartford does not meet its growth goal (4% as opposed to
5%). In this year, the court issues a formal warning to the state and subur-
ban districts. Such a warning will indicate that, if the state-in concert
with school districts-fails to improve achievement of racially and socio-
91. A growth goal of 5% means that, in a given year, 5% more students will meet
the "Proficient" standard on the Connecticut Mastery Test (CMT) and the CAPT. Note
that the setting of the growth goal can be reasonably constructed based on expert testi-
mony, and that my choice of 5% is simply illustrative. Additionally, 5% growth could be
defined as a 5% growth in average raw score (or percent correct).
92. Note that the achievement proficiency for Hartford is calculated based on the
achievement of students from Hartford, whether or not they are served in suburban dis-
tricts. The achievement proficiency for suburban districts is calculated based on the
achievement of studentsfroni the suburban districts. In each district, data for Hartford and
suburban students' achievement should be disaggregated.
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economically isolated students, additional equity power may be exercised
down the line. In this hypothetical, however, the percentage of students
who meet the proficiency standard sufficiently grows from years three to
seven such that the target proficiency goal of 80% is ultimately met. As
long as Hartford students are at or above this target proficiency level, the
need for further intervention is no longer necessary because educational
opportunities-as measured by outcomes-for students in Hartford are
sufficiently equalized relative to those students' peers in their region.
This illustrative hypothetical represents an ideal situation in which,
under the sliding scale remedy, courts would not need to further enjoin
Hartford's surrounding school districts that have chosen to participate in a
voluntary regime. In the purely voluntary open choice/inter-district
magnet school world that exists today, however, we have seen that the
educational outcomes of Hartford students have remained far behind state
averages.
2. Compulsory Inter-District Acceptance
(Urban Outcomes Not Met, Suburban Outcomes Met)
In some cases, the state's efforts may fail to produce the outcomes
prescribed by the court. The court would execute its threat to use addi-
tional equity power to ensure that the outcomes are met in the long term.
Thus, although the remedy remains largely voluntary (with respect to its
programmatic aspects), the court may force the hand of the state to ensure
that these programs are being fully utilized to drive student achievement.
Figure Four illustrates a hypothetical where this may be necessary.
FIGURE 4: HYPOTHETICAL WHERE COURT ENJOINS STATE TO
COMPEL INTER-DISTRICT ACCEPTANCE
Growth Goal = 5% Target = 80% Proficiency in Both Reading and Math
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Suburban 80% 82% 84% 85% 78% 81% 81% 80% 82%
District 80% 82% 84%_85%
Hartford 53% 55% 57% 63% 66% 70% 72% 77% 80%
Overall
urt Proceed- Proceed- Proceed-
Action Baseline Proceed Warning Proceed Proceed Proceed at or at or at orI I I I I I Above Goal Above Goal Above Goal
Maintaining an annual growth goal of 5% along with a target of
80%, this example shows how the equity power of the court may need
to be expanded or contracted over time. In year two of this hypothetical,
the state receives a warning because Hartford students have not met the
growth goal. In year three, the court enjoins the state to compel its sub-
urban districts to accept a specified number of socioeconomically
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isolated students from Hartford.93 This happens if two conditions are
met:
1. Hartford students do not meet their annual growth goal.
2. The suburban districts' students have achieved at a level
94at or above the previous year.
Because these conditions are met in year three, suburban districts are
in a position that enables them to accept an incremental number of Hart-
ford students. Thus, suburban districts in this hypothetical would be
compelled to accept Hartford students.9s These students would be assigned
based on an individualized assessment that ensures that each student is
placed in settings that are less socioeconotnically isolated than their current
setting. 96 Students who are in the most severe contexts of racial and eco-
nomic isolation will have priority over less isolated students in receiving
these transfer opportunities.
In year five, however, the academic outcomes of the suburban dis-
tricts in this hypothetical decline below the target proficiency level. In
that year, the court would reduce the number of students who must be
offered spaces to attend school in the suburban districts. When achieve-
ment is declining in suburban districts, these districts are not in a position
to accept more students. Nevertheless, the court still must compel the
state to send students to those districts that have maintained or improved
their performance in year three. Additionally, the state must account for its
failure to ensure that the performance level of suburban students is being
maintained.
Continuing through the remaining years of the hypothetical, Hart-
ford's suburban districts will again be compelled to accept additional low-
income Hartford students in years six and seven. This is because, in both
years, the achievement of the suburban districts remains above the target
as the achievement of Hartford students fails to meet the court-ordered
growth rate. In year eight, however, Hartford student achievement has
progressed to a point where there is no need for further judicial interven-
tion. At year nine, Hartford students have reached the achievement
93. Because the sliding scale remedy is gradual, this specified number of students
should be at a reasonable level (not unduly burdensome to districts).
94. This assumes that the suburban district's proficiency is above the court-
determined proficiency target (in this case, 80%). If suburban districts are below the target
proficiency, they must be growing at a rate commensurate with the growth rate to have
"achieved at a level at or above the previous year."
95. For simplicity, I focus my discussion on suburban districts as a whole.The court
may consider the academic performance of individual suburban districts in deciding the
preferred order in which suburbs must accept Hartford students. However, student assign-
ments should be distributed as uniformly as possible across the metropolitan region.
96. This would entail a holistic assessment of racial, ethnic, and economic demo-
graphics of each individual student and the overall context of their current school setting.
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proficiency target. Thus, the court does not mandate any additional levels
of compulsory acceptance.
On a final note, the compulsory acceptance requirements for subur-
ban districts would be entirely marginal under the sliding scale remedy.
Thus, if West Hartford were required to accept fifty Hartford students in
2015 but, based on its academic improvements, this requirement was re-
duced to twenty in 2016, it would not be allowed to transfer thirty
students back to Hartford. All of the fifty students who were accepted in
2015 must have the right to remain in West Hartford, but West Hartford
would be able to accept fewer students in 2016.
3. Creation of a Regional School District (Urban Outcomes Not Met,
Suburban Outcomes Met Over Sustained Period)
In instances where students who reside in suburban school districts
continue to achieve at or above established benchmarks while urban stu-
dents fail to make progress, the sliding scale remedy may eventually
compel the court to enjoin the state to create a metropolitan school dis-
trict in an urban area. This option would be viewed as a last resort, but
would reflect the spirit of the Sheff ruling. As noted in the Sheff dissent,
one implication of the majority opinion was that a remedy would require
a "statewide realignment of school districts.
' '
97
Should a metropolitan district be necessary, it may be a result of
suburban districts' failure to support the achievement of urban students.
By the time this injunctive option will have been considered, the court
will have already mandated that many city students attend high-
performing suburban schools. If the students who are compulsorily
accepted into suburban districts fail to improve their achievement levels at
this point (and suburban students are still achieving at high levels), subur-
ban districts have likely neglected to undertake the efforts necessary to
improve the achievement of Hartford students. This failure of suburban
districts to "play their part" would justify a more intrusive remedy.
Meanwhile, if suburban districts have done their part in educating
students who are mandated to attend schools in their district and the aca-
demic achievement of socioeconomically isolated students continues to
stagnate, this indicates one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that
the urban district may be operating efficiently with its resources but, even
with that efficiency, it simply cannot overcome the challenges of socio-
economic isolation. In this case, a larger, regional district may be the only
way that the state could fulfill its constitutional obligation. The second
possibility is that the urban district is not operating efficiently. In that case,
the court may compel the state to improve the efficiency of the urban
district before taking the step to require regionalization.
97. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1332 (Borden,J., dissenting).
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If the court determines that school district consolidation is the most
efficient step, it should force the legislature's hand. School district consoli-
dation can produce positive academic outcomes. Although Christopher
Berry found that the gains in educational outcomes that result from in-
creasing school district size can be reduced by the effects of having larger
schools within those districts,"" Sebold and Dato (1981) found a positive
relationship between student outcomes and district size for Califonia high
schools, and Ferguson and Ladd (1996) discovered a positive relationship
for elementary schools in Alabama.' ' District consolidation may be "the
elephant in the room" for some, but it may be economically inefficient to
maintain small local schools in rural or suburban towns."" A recent study
also found that school district regionalization in Arkansas would produce
a 34% cost savings per student due to reduced inefficiencies in spending
on teacher salary, supply costs, and total costs.""
4. Crisis: State Takeover and Legislative Response (Urban Outcomes
Not Met, Suburban Outcomes Not Met Over Sustained Period)
In the worst-case scenario, the sliding scale remedy may fail to pro-
duce adequate academic achievement for both suburban students and
socioeconomically isolated students for a sustained period of time. In par-
ticular, the achievement of suburban districts may decline while the
achievement of socioeconomically isolated students fails to improve (or
perhaps sinks below the proficiency target). In these instances, the court
would not be allowed to compel additional participation by suburban
districts. This would constitute a crisis situation of a far broader nature
that may necessitate significant state action. Whatever the reason-
inadequate state funding, poor management of districts by the state, or
some other exogenous factor-the state needs to take steps above and
beyond socioeconomic desegregation to improve educational quality. In
such instances the court should provide the state legislature with compre-
hensive remedial principles based on a full and complete definition of a
"meaningful educational opportunity."'12 Courts should be "specific in
their findings about mismanagement, waste, inefficient practices, con-
straints imposed by collective bargaining agreements, state tenure laws,
98. See Christopher R. Berry, School District Consolidation and Student Outcomes: Does
Size Matter, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 56, 76
(William G. Howell ed., 2005).
99. Id. at 65.
100. See, e.g., HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 284.
101. See Marvin E. Dodson Ill & Thomas A. Garrett, Inefficient Education Spending in
Public School Districts:A Case for Consolidation?, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 270, 279 (2004).
102. For a good discussion of principles that could encompass such a definition, see
Michael A. Kebell, Poverty, "Meaningfil" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the
Courts, 85 N.C.L. REv. 1467 (2007).
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and so on .... ,"0" Providing these clear principles and specific findings
would provide useful guidance and leverage to the state legislature as it
determines the next course of action.'"4And, in the spirit of the sliding
scale remedy, the court should threaten specific remedial actions that will
be imposed on the legislature if it fails to abate the crisis.
C. A Brief Note on Sliding Scale Remedies in the
School Funding Litigation Context
As Kahlenberg has noted in his volume advocating socioeconomic
integration of schools, "[m]oney clearly does matter, but breaking up
concentrations of poverty-which will also tend to equalize funding-
matters much more. '""" The sliding scale remedy attempts to address this
problem. Nevertheless, courts could consider applying an analogous rem-
edy in the school funding litigation context. Such a remedy could, for
example, award additional finances to low-performing districts which
continue to improve academically yet lag behind the academic targets set
by the state. Many school finance systems do not focus either directly or
effectively on student achievement goals, and Hanushek argues for
stronger accountability mechanisms for school funding regimes.'"
An analogous school funding sliding scale remedy would not specify a
specific target funding amount. Like the sliding scale remedy for school
desegregation, it would adjust funding levels based on student outcomes. In
school finance litigation suits, remedies have usually focused on specific
levels of school funding,' 1 7 and courts have often relied on "costing out"
studies to guide them in determining appropriate levels of funding that are
associated with a particular remedy. Costing out studies are limited in their
ability to aid courts in constructing remedies, however, because it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine which levels of funding will ensure particular
educational outcomes, and there is a disagreement among scholars on the
degree of funding necessary to ensure outcomes are met."'8 Just as we can-
not know which socioeconomic balances will produce ideal outcomes in
classrooms, we also may not know exactly how much funding--along with
how it is provided-will produce outcomes in a particular context.
103. HANUSHEK Er AL.,supra note 13, at 283.
104. See id.
105. KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 84.
106. HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 260.
107. See, e.g., Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration tile Fourth Wave
in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY LJ. 1613, 1614-15 (2007);
108. Id. at 1626; see also Eric A. Hanushek, The Alchemy of "Costing Out" an Adequate
Education (Sept. 2006) (revised version of working paper prepared for 2005 conference
Adequacy Lawsuits: Their Growing Impact on Anmerican Education, Kennedy Sch. of Govt., Har-
vard Univ.), available at http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/EWPA/Research/SchoolFinance/
AlchemyCostingOut/AlchemyCosting-Out.pdf.
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III. CHALLENGES TO THE SLIDING SCALE REMEDY
Some may challenge the sliding scale remedy on various grounds.
First, states have long traditions of local control of their school systems.
Thus, any court-mandated desegregation could be viewed as a violation
of separation of powers within the state. Second, some may argue that the
sliding scale remedy could induce significant White flight from suburban
school districts. Third, some may challenge the premise that desegregation
efforts can promote academic outcomes. Finally, some may argue that the
sliding scale remedy is unconstitutional in light of relevant federal prece-
dents.This Part addresses each of these concerns in turn.
A. The Challenge of Localism
Because the sliding scale remedy may either compel suburban
school districts to accept students from urban communities or lead to the
creation of a metropolitan school district, some may express concerns that
the sliding scale remedy unreasonably infringes school districts' traditional
autonomy. In this Part, I address the legal significance of this issue and its
relevance in creating obstacles to the sliding scale remedy. While local
control principles would undoubtedly create political obstacles to reform,
the extent to which local control creates legal obstacles to reform is actu-
ally minimal. In fact, the state's obligation to address affirmative
constitutional rights always prevails. The federalist principles that govern
the U.S. Supreme Court's relationships with states are not the same prin-
ciples that guide state supreme courts' relationships with their
corresponding localities.
Local control is often used to sustain impediments to educational
equality. First, local control provides incentives for districts to use exclu-
sionary zoning and other practices to ensure that relatively affluent
communities may exclude the less wealthy.' 9 Through minimum lot sizes,
limitations on multifamily dwellings, and mandatory-attached two car
garages, municipalities are able to exclude low-cost housing and therefore
low-income students."" In addition, wealthier school districts have incen-
tives to zone in ways that maximize the local tax base while minimizing
the local tax rate."' Left unchecked, local control allows for the perpetua-
109. Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L.
REv. 773, 803 (1992).
110. See McUsic, supra note 32, at 1365.
111. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 109, at 803-04 (arguing that towns zone in ways
that maximize property values and limit the number of school age children who may live
in the district because this reduces the town's education burden); Daniel R. Mandelker,
Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEx. L.
REV. 1217 (1977).
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tion of de facto segregation by both race and class, denying low-income
students from adjoining towns equal educational opportunities.
In this regard, purely local control of school districts undermines the
need of the state to fulfill its constitutional obligation. To the extent that
local control can be harmonized with the state's need to fulfill its obliga-
tion to ensure that its children receive substantially equal educational
opportunities, there may not be a need to utilize educational remedies
that restrict local control. If a particular state fails to meet its constitutional
obligation, has attempted to work with local districts, and school districts
fail to cooperate, however, "the courts should not rely on local control to
deny rights to equal educational opportunity or constitutionally adequate
education based on state constitutional provisions."1
2
When states have been sued for inadequate or inequitable school
funding schemes, the state has always had the burden of showing that its
constitutional obligations are met."13 Because state constitutions confer
educational obligations, the buck stops with the state.
Courts recognize this. In some instances, state courts have been def-
erential to state takeovers of school districts. ' 4 As of 2002, twenty-four
states had laws authorizing state education agencies to displace a school
board and take over the operation of a school district, and from the late
1980's to the mid-2000's there were nearly fifty school district takeovers
in nineteen states.'" As one scholar admits, "[t]o the extent that courts
have accepted the local control argument, it has functioned as a shield to
sustain state policy, not as a sword to alter policy in a more pro-local di-
re c tio n . '"11
Additionally, school districts do not have the same degree of auton-
omy as other forms of local government. Typical state constitutions that
confer home rule authority on particular localities refer to municipalities or
cities, not school districts-and some state constitutions specifically dis-
claim the applicability of home rule to school districts."17 These localities
are ultimately creatures of the state and, despite their high degree of
112. Briffault, supra note 109, at 811.
113. Several state courts have made this determination. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P2d 806, 813 (Ariz. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
790 S.W2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378
(N.H. 1993);Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W2d 139, 140-141 (Tenn. 1993).
114. See, e.g., Contini v. Bd. of Educ. Of Newark, 668 A.2d 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995); In re Trenton Bd. of Educ., 431 A.2d 808 (N.J. 1981).
115. Richard Briffault, The Local Sclool District in American Law, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL
BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 24,34 (William G. Howell ed., 2005).
116. Briffault, supra note 115, at 51.
117. See Briffault, supra note 115, at 32. The Illinois constitution explicitly states that
local units of government do not include school districts. ILL. CONST., art.VII, sect. 1.The
New York constitution's home rule article states that the home rule power shall not "
restrict or impair any power of the legislature concerning the maintenance, support, or
administration of the public school system." N.Y. CONST., art. IX, sect. 3.
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power, they "cannot complain when the state reclaims its delegated pow-
ers."-" Others have indicated that, although school districts are commonly
provided with de facto legal autonomy over their affairs," states can ex-
pand or contract that autonomy at any time.' 2(1
Nevertheless, local control of schools is a "legitimate state objective"
in Connecticut's jurisprudence.'12 Further, a long-standing norm of home
rule makes school regionalization or consolidation proposals politically
untenable in Connecticut. 2 2 But local control was not the overriding
consideration in Sheff. In fact, although the Sheff court acknowledged that
"the [school] districting scheme presently further[ed] the legitimate non-
racial interests of permitting considerable local control and accountability
in educational matters,',123 the constitutional interest of the plaintiffs was
of greater significance. 4
By some accounts, local control is a mere social construction-a
mythical fiction of sorts.' 25 Christopher Collier, the longtime Connecticut
historian, once said that "[t]he towns are not now, and never have been
since the founding of this state, autonomous in any respect.' 2' Susan
Eaton argues that "the myth of local control engendered a convenient,
distracting detour around central matters in equal education-place, race,
and class.'
27
Federal constitutional law, meanwhile, places few limits on the state's
authority to prescribe boundaries of school districts and municipalities.'2 "
A school district's residents do not have federal constitutional claims
against a particular state if the state chooses to redraw a district's bounda-
ries and, for this reason, "state governments have broad authority to create
118. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 H~av. L. REv. 1833, 1901-02 (2001).
119. See Briffault, supra note 115, at 26.
120. Briffault, supra note 115, at 28.
121. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding that Connecti-
cut school funding system was unconstitutional and that equalization of funding would
not inhibit local control).
122. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 39, at 632-33 (explaining that efforts in 1969 to pass
a bill that would authorize the Department of Education to redraw district boundary lines
to remedy racial imbalances was derailed after the Commissioner of Education claimed to
be a "champion of local control").
123. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1288.
124. Id. at 1289 ("Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the
severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the
defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that con-
tinue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state
constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity.").
125. See, e.g., SusAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON
TRIAL 142-43 (2006) (describing how local control is a legal fiction in Connecticut).
126. Id. at 142.
127. Id. at 142-43.
128. See, e.g., Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
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alter, or abolish school districts; revise their powers; and restructure or
even eliminate their boards."' - District boundary changes have only been
struck down by federal courts when "modifications deliberately impacted
adversely on the racial balance of students, impeded a remedy for de jure
segregation, or intentionally helped a religious group.' 3 Although we will
see that Milliken v. Bradley prescribes limits on the federal equity power to
redress violations of the Federal Constitution, this case does not place sig-
nificant limitations on sliding scale remedies which address state
constitutional violations.'3'
The practice of local autonomy is currently being reconciled with
the legal theory of state power over education. 32 For example, state au-
thority over charter schools has provided the state with a means of
exercising control over local districts. Additionally, NCLB has placed more
control in the hands of the state as it sets statewide standards and holds
students and districts accountable for successfully attaining them. Because
the state is now accountable at the federal level, it may decide to exercise
more or less authority over local school districts depending on the per-
formance of various districts.
Notwithstanding the sliding scale remedy's provisions that limit local
control, the remedy is narrowly tailored to enable local school districts to
maintain local control to a reasonable extent. Districts are given the op-
portunity to create voluntary solutions long before equity power is
imposed on them. However, these districts need to be part of the solu-
tion-not part of the problem-to maintain the local control they so
desire. Legally, local control shouldn't present roadblocks to state constitu-
tional remedies, although such considerations may be an overriding
interest in federal constitutional remedies.
133
B. White Flight
White flight can be a significant problem when school districts de-
segregate. Professor Rossell has noted that between 45% and 56% of
Whites leave a school district after the first year of a desegregation
order.'3 1 Controlled choice plans which eliminate district boundaries and
allow all families to rank preferred school choices can also be problematic
129. Briffault, supra note 115, at 29. See also CHARLES J. Russo, REUTTER'S THE LAW
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 169-70 (7th ed. 2009) ("Acting pursuant to their plenary power,
state legislatures can set district boundaries, abolish local school units, and/or redistrict
states regardless of pre-existing boundaries ...
130. See id. at 171 (emphasis added).
131. See discussion infra Part IlI.D.1.
132. Briffault, supra note 115, at 54.
133. See discussion of Rodriguez and Milliken infra Part IV.D.1.
134. Christine H. Rossell, An Analysis of tire Court Decisions in Sheff v. O'Neill and
Possible Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN. L. Ev. 1187, 1208 (1997).
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because they may produce significant White flight when students from
White families do not receive their first-choice school.'
35
Any remedy that affects the racial composition of schools in a pre-
dominately White area runs the potential risk of inducing flight. For
example, White parents may be concerned that the quality of their chil-
dren's education may be adversely impacted by the presence of minority
students. They may fear that "students in a newly integrated setting may
interact poorly with each other (and with their teachers), contributing to
a strained or hostile atmosphere and poorer education; parents of both
races may even fear violence." '-"
In constructing a remedy one must be mindful of the social costs of
White flight. Therefore, an effective remedy maximizes integrative and
educational outcomes while ensuring that the perceived social costs to
suburban Whites are not large enough to induce flight.'3 7 IfWhites do not
perceive that they will be adversely affected by a remedy, they will be far
less likely to leave.
The sliding scale remedy is designed to minimize the impact of
White flight. Because it is tied to the educational outcomes of all students,
the remedy will ensure that the degree of equity power enforced on a
suburban district will be directly related to the achievement of students in
that district. Thus, suburban districts that struggle to educate their own
students will be less constrained by the remedy than those districts that
successfully educate their students. The remedy is also gradual, which
gives suburban districts and parents time to adjust to their new circum-
stances instead of being "scared away" by the immediacy of a more abrupt
remedy. Financial incentives, finally, could be designed to run with the
students who enter the suburban districts, encouraging suburban partici-
pation.
The messaging of the sliding scale remedy is critical to successfully
mitigate concerns of White flight. Parents of suburban children must first
be told that the remedy is initially voluntary. Second, they must be told
that the only time a court may impose additional remedial pressure on
their school district is when their children are still achieving at or above
previous levels. Meanwhile, if the achievement of urban students ade-
quately improves, little to no judicial intervention may be necessary. No
compulsory remedies will be imposed on suburban districts if they work
with the state to determine voluntary desegregation plans that serve eve-
ryone's best interest.
135. Id. at 1225. See also Christine H. Rossell & David Armor, Magnet Schools and
Desegregation, MAGNET SCHOOLS AND DESEGREGATION, QUALITY AND CHOICE (1994); and
Christine H. Rossell, Controlled Choice: Not Enough Choice, Too Much Control?, 31 URB. Arr.
REv. 43 (1995).
136. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585,633 (1983).
137. Cf Id. at 652-56 (discussing the provision of educational incentives as a tool to
improve Whites' assessment of integration).
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Of course, this argument assumes that parents' primary concern in
choosing a school district is the academic achievement of their students,
and that concerns about achievement are a primary motivation for White
flight. If mandatory integration remedies are imposed or even threatened
upon a suburban school district, it is possible that parents may choose to
move outside of the Sheff region out of concerns relating to the racial or
socioeconomic status of students who will go to school with their children.
Test scores have always been a significant determinant of parents'
school choices, however.' 38 Although studies have found that demographic
considerations may have a greater impact on property values than test'39
scores, one of these studies notes that "the findings may reflect the fact
that people make judgments about school quality using easily available sig-
nals."'" Indeed, one scholar has directly stated that "[r]ace, being so readily
apparent, becomes a proxy for school quality that easily tips the choice be-
tween otherwise equivalent schools and neighborhoods to live in.
' '
1
4
1
Parents may have found race to be a useful proxy for school quality
in the past, but this could change. As student achievement data becomes
increasingly transparent, the increased emphasis on test scores by parents
as they choose a place of residence "may reflect increasing public aware-
ness of the availability of information on school test scores, along with
possibly greater saliency of test scores following the passage of the federal
'No Child Left Behind' Act of 2001."'-1 And, despite potential concerns
that racism may limit Connecticut parents' desire to send their children to
an integrated school, a recent study revealed that "many white parents
(55%) did voice a willingness to enroll their child in a quality integrated
setting.
By its design, the sliding scale remedy could show parents that aca-
denic achievement and socioeconomic integration are not mutually
138. See, e.g., Patrick Welsh, It's No Longer Uncool to Do Well in School, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 14, 1999, at BO (noting that middle-class parents traditionally ask about test
scores when considering neighborhoods and visiting schools); see also John M. Clapp et al.,
W'hich School Attributes Matter? The Influence of School District Performance and Demographic
Composition on Property Values, 63 J. UR13aN ECON. 451, 464 (2008) (finding that student test
scores appear to have increased in importance for explaining housing prices in Connecti-
cut in recent years, while the importance of minority composition has declined).
139. See, e.g., Jack Dougherty et al., School Choice in Suburbia: Test Scores, Race, and
Housing Markets, 115 AM. J. ED. 523 (2009) (finding that, while both test scores and race
explain home prices, race is more influential); see also Clapp, supra note 138, at 463 (gener-
ally concluding that people in Connecticut were more concerned about changes in
geographic attributes than the changes in test scores when deciding how much to pay for
homes).
140. Clapp, supra note 138, at 464.
141. Andrew J. Gold, In the Aftermath of Sheff-Considerations for a Reinedy, 29 CONN.
L. REv. 1043,1048 (1997).
142. Clapp, supra note 138, at 464.
143. Bilal Sekou, I Support School Integration, But... : Sheff v. O'Neill More than Ten
Years Later and No End in Sight, 42 EQuiTY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 97, 105 (2009).
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exclusive ideals. If this occurs, it is even more likely that parents will be
amenable to integrated schools. When the Connecticut Center For
School Change held public fora throughout the state to discuss its proposal
to create a regional school district, "[o]ne message that came through very
strongly from [its] process is that before [parents] will support changes in
the status quo, the public must be able to see a connection between educa-
tional reforms and improved educational quality.
'4 4
Yet, "if further studies continue to show that suburban home buyers
are motivated more by racial preferences than by higher test scores, then it
may call into question the underlying premise for expanding school
choice.'14 If this is true, however, one advantage of the sliding scale rem-
edy is its gradualism. Because urban students would be incrementally
integrated into suburban districts under the sliding scale remedy, the rem-
edy could serve to build more tolerance for integrated schools than would
be possible with a more abrupt remedy. More parents who may have
originally been more concerned with race than student achievement out-
comes may value diversity as being useful for their kids. Even if a small
minority of parents were to remain intolerant and leave the district for
purely racial reasons, this effect would be minimized by the design of the
remedy.
C. Validity of "The Harm and Benefit Thesis"
For the sliding scale remedy to work well, integrated schools must
produce better academic outcomes for students. Although social science
research has been divided on this issue,4 6 many studies have found that
integrated schools produce academic benefits for the socioeconomically
disadvantaged. This includes a recent study that examined the impact of
Connecticut's interdistrict magnet schools on student achievement. "' A
sixteen-year longitudinal study of Black children who took part in a vol-
untary city-suburban busing program, moreover, concluded that "those
who graduated from desegregated schools were more likely to attend col-
lege, to complete more years of college, to hold higher status jobs, and to
work in more desegregated work environments than those students who
144. See Gordon A. Bruno and Kathryn A. McDermott, Beyond the Unexamined Rem-
edy: Moving Towvard Quality, Integrated Schools, at 2 (July 2000) (on file with author).
145. See Dougherty, supra note 139, at 545.
146. See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
(1995).
147. The study found that attendance at an interdistrict magnet school has positive
effects on the math and reading achievement of urban students. See Robert Bifulco, Casey
D. Cobb, & Courtney Bell, Can Interdistrict Choice Boost Student Achievement? The Case of
Connecticut's Interdistrict Magnet &hool Program, 31 EDuC. EVAL. & POL'Y ANAL. 323 (2009).
[VOL. 15:477
Sliding Towards Educational Outcomes
attended segregated schools in Hartford."'' 8 Several other scholars have
noted the positive effects of desegregation on academic achievement.
4 9
Nevertheless, some studies of desegregation and achievement have
found little or no change in achievement or other educational outcomes
for White students.' "' The NAACP noted in its brief in Freeman v. Pitts
that, although "desegregation is generally associated with moderate gains
in the achievement of black students," "achievement of white students is
unaffected.'' "
Some are also not convinced that the academic benefits of integra-
tion outweigh the harms. Unfortunately, "[i]n spite of voluminous
research and writing on this topic, there is still no definitive study of the
relationship between school desegregation and academic achievement,
and no group of studies has generated consensus among social scientists
who have conducted reviews of the research literature.'"5 2 In a recent
study involving teachers in the Lafayette, Louisiana school district that
desegregated in response to a 2000 court order, teachers noted concerns
that the desegregation resulted in increased discipline problems and that
the court's "attempt to redistribute the social advantages of the 'haves' to
the district's 'have nots,' appear[ed] to have been a zero-sum game."""
However, Raleigh, North Carolina recently implemented a socio-
economic integration plan which resulted in significant gains for both
148. ARMOR, supra note 146, at 70.
149. For a good overview of studies that support the positive effects of integrated
schooling on educational outcomes, see Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New'
Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 943-
954 (2002); Carl Bankston Ill & Stephen J. Caldas, The American School Dilemma: Race and
Scholastic Performance, 38 Soc. Q. 423, 428 (1997) (showing racially integrated settings are
linked to improved achievement for Black high school students);Jomills Henry Braddock
II & James M. McPartland, The Social and Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, in
EQUITY AND CHOICE 5, 63-68 (1988) (showing both long and short term consequences of
racially diverse primary and secondary schools and colleges, including improved race rela-
tions, increased academic achievement, and preparation for diverse work settings);Thomas
D. Cook, What Have Black Children Gained Academically Frot School Integration? Examination
of the Meta-Analytic Evidence, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 6, 41 (T.
Cook et al. eds., 1984) (concluding that desegregation has a positive effect on reading
scores).
150. ARMoR, supra note 146, at 71.
151. Brief of the NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents app. 51,
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (No. 89-1290) (quoting W Hawley and M. Snylie,
The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial Integration, in
ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 284-85 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A.
Taylor eds., 1988).
152. ARMOR, supra note 146, at 76 (emphasis added).
153. Stephen J. Caldas, Carl L. Bankston Ill, & Judith S. Cain, Social Capital, Academic
Capital, and the "Harm and Benefit" Thesis: Evidence From a Desegregating School District, in
THE END OF DESEG REGATION? 121, 143 (2003).
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Whites and African Americans. ' 54 Moreover, Project Concern, a precursor
to Open Choice, illustrated that Hartford students who went to suburban
schools and voluntarily chose to stay in those schools had significantly
higher rates of college enrollment and significantly lower rates of drop-
ping out than Hartford kids who were not in the program.'5' Although
David Armor has noted that "those who withdrew from the program
were having more academic and behavioral problems than the 
stay-ins,
this only underscores the need for transparency in communicating the
educational attainment of those students who transfer to reduced-
isolation settings. Under the sliding scale remedy, parents will be able to
see the effects reduced isolation has on the academic achievement of their
children from year to year.
The gradual and voluntary nature of the sliding scale remedy will
maximize the benefits of the harm and benefit thesis while tempering
some of the concerns that have been raised. If integrated settings produce
the outcomes that many scholars believe they will, districts can and will
continue to apply the remedy. If integrated settings do not facilitate pro-
gress towards adequate academic outcomes for all students over the long
run, courts will not compel further integration. Any adverse impact on
districts will be marginal because the court evaluates progress on a peri-
odic basis.
D. Federal Legal Challenges
Because states that adopt the sliding scale remedy will be doing so
to ensure that they are meeting their affirmative obligations under state
constitutions, most challenges to the sliding scale remedy must come from
federal constitutional precedents and decisions. Although some of the
relevant precedents that are triggered by the sliding scale remedy may pre-
sent obstacles, I argue that sliding scale remedies would pass constitutional
muster.
1. Rodriguez, Milliken, and the "Scope of the Remedy"
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez declared that there
is no federally recognized constitutional right to an education.' 7 Beyond
154. Alan Finder, As Test Scores Jump, Raleigh Credits Integration by Income, N.Y. TiMES,
Sept. 25, 2005, at 1 ("in Wake County, only 40 percent of black students in grades three
through eight scored at grade level on state tests a decade ago. Last spring, 80% did. His-
panic students have made similar strides. Overall, 91 percent of students in those grades
scored at grade level in the spring, up from 79 percent 10 years ago."), available at
http://www.nytinmes.com/2005/09/25/education/25raleigh.htuml.
155. Gold, supra note 141,at 1048.
156. ARMOR, supra note 146, at 109.
157. San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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limiting the scope of federal authority over education, the ruling empha-
sized the importance of local control of public school systems. ' 5" For
example, the court expressed concern that "other systems of school fi-
nancing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of
the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local auton-
omy.... [W]ith increased control of the purse strings at the state level will
go increased control over local policies.
''
1
s
59
Although the Rodriguez decision revealed the Court's normative
support for local control, however, it did not limit the state's authority to
limit local autonomy over school districts." ' The court simply deferred to
the state's choice to promote local control of education. Thus, Rodriguez
does not say anything about the equity power state courts may assert
within their states.
Another Supreme Court case that circumscribes limits to state-wide
educational remedies is Milliken v. Bradley.'"' The Milliken court deter-
mined that the existence of de jure segregation in metropolitan Detroit
was not a sufficient reason to impose an inter-district remedy on its sur-
rounding suburbs because the state did not affirmatively create the
interdistrict segregation. "2 Because it is extremely difficult to demonstrate
that the state acted to produce segregated conditions, the Milliken prece-
dent created a significant roadblock in the quest to create inter-district
remedies in school desegregation cases.
It is the Milliken case, in fact, that encouraged the voluntary remedy
in Sheff"" The Milliken court endorsed local autonomy much more
strongly than the Rodriguez court: "[n]o single tradition in public educa-
tion is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and
to the quality of the educational process.,64
As the Milliken court acknowledged, however, "a federal remedial
power may be exercised 'only on the basis of a constitutional violation'
and, '[as] with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the
158. See discussion in Briffault,supra note 115,at 40-41.
159. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 51-53.
160. But see supra Part lll.A. (describing how the state has the authority to expand or
contract local control over districts as it pleases).
161. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
162. See id. at 757.
163. The Sheff court, in fact, acknowledged that the state did not "intentionally seg-
regate racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system." 678 A.2d at
1274. The state's districting statute of 1909 was the "single most importantfator contributing
to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school
system." Id.
164. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42.
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scope of the remedy.'"'"" Because the federal constitutional violation in
Milliken was solely the de jure existence of segregated schools within in-
ner-city Detroit, the remedy was confined to Detroit.' In Sheff, however,
a state constitutional violation-de facto existence of racial and ethnic
isolation throughout Greater Hartford-was the issue that deprived chil-
dren of substantially equal educational opportunities. Because the state
constitutional problem of segregation extends beyond Hartford, so can the
remedy.'"
Because the sliding scale remedy would apply only to state constitu-
tional decisions, state courts would not be constrained in applying these
remedies. Inter-district remedies imposed by state courts would not create
the federalism concerns that arise when such remedies are created by fed-
eral courts." As long as a remedy is constructed in a way that does not
violate the Federal Constitution, the state has every right to mandate an
inter-district remedy. The only inter-district solution that would explicitly
violate the Federal Constitution would be a purely race-based classifica-
tion scheme.' 7" Because the classification scheme applied under the sliding
scale remedy would be primarily socioeconomic, there is no constitu-
tional violation.
Even if one argued that the "scope of the remedy" standard should
be strictly applied to any inter-district remedy, moreover, the sliding scale
remedy is designed so that scope of the remedy is entirely dependent on
the scope of the violation. The state and its subsidiary school districts are
given an opportunity to address the violation as soon as they are told that
the violation exists. If they do not, the continued existence of the viola-
tion is that much more egregious, warranting broader remedies over time.
Once suburban school districts know a violation exists, inaction could be
construed to represent a form of affirmative effort to perpetuate the con-
stitutional wrong. Assuming a legal duty attached to the state upon the
165. Id. at 738 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,16
(1972)(emphasis added)).
166. The city of Detroit, in fact, affirmatively created the segregated conditions
within its chools. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717 (1974) ("The District Court, after con-
cluding that various acts by the petitioner Detroit Board of Education had created and
perpetuated school segregation in Detroit, and that the acts of the Board, as a subordinate
entity of the State, were attributable to the State, ordered the Board to submit Detroit-
only desegregation plans.")
167. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281 ("[Tjhe existence of extreme racial and ethnic isola-
tion in the public school system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal
educational opportunity .
168. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 32, at 172.
169. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1995) (explaining that federal court
remedies imposed on federal agencies do not raise "the same federalism concerns that are
implicated when a federal court issues a remedial order against a State.").
170. See infra Part ilI.D.2.
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decision in Sheff,'7' suburban acts of omission add to the scope of the vio-
lation. 7 2 Thus, as time passes, the Milliken standard could be read to allow
for additional injunctive relief beyond the Hartford border.
The Milliken decision can also be distinguished insofar as that deci-
sion purely related to an inter-district remedy that intended to promote
racial integration. As the court noted, such remedies require a showing
that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a
single school district, have been a substantial cause of inter-district segre-
gation. 73 What happens, however, if economically discriminatory acts of
the state promote economic segregation? When economic segregation is
what creates the state constitutional violation,'74 one could argue that the
local policies of municipalities and their corresponding school districts' 75
affirmatively create those conditions. In these cases there would be a
strong argument for inter-district remedies, even under Milliken. Future
cases that apply the sliding scale remedy may well address de jure socio-
economic segregation that occurs as a result of municipal zoning or other
similar policies that deprive children from attaining equitable educational
opportunities. Finally, the Milliken court expressed concern about the jus-
ticiability of the remedy:
[T]he District Court will become first, a de facto 'legislative
authority' to resolve these complex questions, and then the
'school superintendent' for the entire area. This is a task which
few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which
would deprive the people of control of schools through their
elected representatives.1
7
6
The sliding scale remedy is justiciable. The court applies a judicially
manageable standard, NCLB test scores, to gauge progress towards the
171. If the legal duty flows to the state, this duty also flows to the school district. In
Connecticut, school boards are not agents of the towns but are creatures of the state. See
Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 83 A.2d 482, 485 (Conn. 1951).
172. Cf Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1277 ("The defendants' argument, derived largely from
principles of federal constitutional law, founders on the fact that article eighth, § 1, and
article first, §§ 1 and 20, impose on the legislature an affirmative constitutional obligation to
provide schoolchildren throughout the state with a substantially equal educational oppor-
tunity.").
173. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
174. This was not what the Sheff court ruled, but it is a possibility in future cases. Cf
Rkichard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconotmic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1591-92
(describing Southern Burlington County NAACP v.Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(NJ. 1975) and other cases to illustrate that courts have interpreted state constitutions to
require affirmative remedies of de facto economic segregation in the housing law context).
175. Through, for example, exclusionary zoning and other tactics. See discussion,
supra Part III.A.
176. Milliken, 418 U.S. 717 at 743-44.
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remedy.'77 All policymaking, at least on the front end, is delegated to states
and municipalities. The court enjoins future action only to remedy the
condition that created the constitutional violation, and this occurs only if
the state fails to meet its legal duty. It is less likely that courts will need to
intervene in policy matters if states and municipalities are given this op-
portunity.7 8
2. Parents Involved and the Sliding Scale Remedy
Parents Involved'"" has also had a significant impact on school integra-
tion plans. The case limited the degree to which race could be considered
in assigning students to particular schools. Although the court's plurality
opinion recognized that remedying the effects of past intentional dis-
crimination is a compelling interest," that compelling interest was not
present in the cities involved in the litigation because those cities were
not subject to court-ordered desegregation at the time of the ruling."'
The plurality did acknowledge the compelling interest of diversity in
education that was upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger,18 2 but it interpreted this
compelling interest narrowly to apply solely to higher education. 13
However, in his controlling concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued
that "[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling
educational goal a school district may pursue."' "4 The main problem with
the student assignment plans in Parents Involved was that they "employed
... crude racial categories."'' " Race-conscious measures could be applied
177. See discussion infra Part IVA.; see also Koski, supra note 7, at 307 ("Armed with
specific, clear, and meaningful standards that are the product of such an extensive political
process, courts are better positioned to overcome their self-imposed obstacles to policy
reform.").
178. Cf.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). Ironically, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court's intra-district remedy was beyond its equity power because, in part, it forced the state
to finance an excessive number of programs within the school district. Id. The trial court
took this action, however, because it was unable to employ an inter-district remedy based on
the Milliken precedent. See RUSSELL WEAVER Er AL., PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIES LAW 103-104
(2007). If districts are able to voluntarily take inter-district steps at the outset, this problem
of an excessive structural remedy could be averted.
179. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701 (2007).
180. Id. at 720.
181. Id. at 720-21.
182. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the University of Michi-
gan Law School admissions program was constitutional under Fourteenth Amendment
strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of
diversity in higher education).
183. Parents Inwolved, 551 U.S. at 703.
184. Id. at 783 (KennedyJ, concurring).
185. Id. at 786 (KennedyJ, concurring).
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to student assignments that seek to achieve diversity, but assignment de-
terminations must be holistic and not be solely race-based.'
6
Because "commentary on Parents Involved generally agrees that the
Court has either closed the door on or left only a narrow opening for
using racial classifications in student assignment plans," districts are likely
to increasingly rely on race-neutral approaches in their attempts to avoid
racial isolation. 7 The Louisville school assignment plan ruled unconstitu-
tional under Parents Involved was recently revised and now considers
family income and education level in assigning students.' 8 Although an-
other lawsuit was filed challenging the constitutionality of that plan, the
Louisville superintendent stated that he "looks forward to winning this
time around" because they worked with attorneys from throughout the
country to comply with Justice Kennedy's ruling.'89
Although the current Sheff remedy sets race-based targets for stu-
dent composition in Hartford area schools, Connecticut Attorney General
Richard Blumenthal has argued that the current remedy is constitutional
under Parents Involved because the Open Choice and inter-district magnet
school assignment plans do not assign students to particular schools on the
basis of race. ' " Rather, the plans use random lottery systems that choose
students based on their residential communities. '9' According to Blumen-
thal, the ruling "struck down mandatory diversity programs containing
rigid racial classifications assigning students based solely on race. Sheff
186. Id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy states that "[rlace may be one
component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs,
should also be considered." Id. at 798.
187. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts
to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elenentary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 277, 293-94 (2009).
188. Andrew Wolfon & Deborah Letter, Nenw Suit Challnltes Jefferson Student Ass k'nynent
Plan, LouISVLLE COURIER-JOURNAL,July 2, 2009, available at http://www.courier-journal.com/
article/20090702/NEWSO105/907020341 /New+suit+challenges+Jefferson+student+
assignment+plan.
189. Id. The lawsuit was recently dropped. See Chris Kenning, Lawyer Says He Will
Drop Student-Assigntnent Lawsuit AgainstJCPS, LOuISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Oct. 6, 2009.
190. The Connecticut Attorney General has implied an implementation plan focus-
ing on economic isolation in addition to racial considerations could pass the constitutional
test under Parents Involved. See 2007 Conn. AG LEXIS 36 (2007) ("Local districts can de-
sign plans which, as Justice Kennedy stated, are race conscious but do not result in a
singular focus on individual students' racial classifications."). This highlights one of the
more interesting distinctions between the Sheff ruling and the Sheff remedy. The Sheff rul-
ing "conclud[ed] that the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public
school system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational opportunity
.Sheff 678 A.2d at 1281 (Conn. 1996).The Sheff remedy as codified by statute, mean-
while, sought to "reduce racial, ethnic, and economic isolation." 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-290
3(b).
191. See Wadhwa, supra note 69, at 1 (quoting a personal communication with Dr.
Bruce Douglas, Executive Director of the Capitol Region Educational Council (CREC)
October 20, 2008).
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programs are voluntary and have flexible diversity goals instead of fixed
quotas."" 2 The Sheff plan would pass the strict scrutiny test more easily
than the current Louisville plan because, although it has numerical goals
to place students in reduced-isolation settings,' '3 race is less of a factor in
assigning students.
For the above reasons, the sliding scale remedy would not be uncon-
stitutional under Parents Involved. First, purely voluntary plans during the
declaratory phase of the remedy would be constitutional just as they are
under the current Sheff implementation-they will be based on factors
other than race, including economic status and place of residence. Simi-
larly, compulsory assignments of urban students to suburban schools
would not be on the basis of race. Rather, they would be based on the
socioeconomic status of the student and the academic performance of
urban and suburban school districts. If the court determines that a metro-
politan school district must be created, student assignments within that
district would not be on the sheer basis of race either.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE SLIDING SCALE REMEDY
This Part discusses additional benefits of the sliding scale remedy.
First, the remedy applies a clear remedial principle that guides courts
throughout its implementation. This will provide legislatures and policy-
makers with clear and consistent remedial standards. Second, unlike past
remedies, the remedy maximizes the court's use of the agenda-setting
power. Finally, the remedy encourages a razor-sharp focus on students
while reducing moral hazard problems within school districts.
A. Clear Remedial Principle
One of the major critiques of the Sheff ruling is that it did not es-
tablish a clear remedial principle. Indeed, this was a critique of the Sheff
majority by Justice Borden, who "[could] find no principle or standard in
the majority opinion by which to measure the level of racial and ethnic
integration of the African American and Hispanic schoolchildren that
[would] be constitutional."' 94 Both federal and state courts that have fash-
ioned desegregation remedies have done a poor job of articulating
192. Press Release, Conn. Attorney Gen.'s Office, ATTORNEY GENERAL STATEMENT ON
U.S. SUPREME COURT RULING ON USE OF RACE IN SCHOOL DIVERSITY PROGRAMS (June 28,
2007), available at http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?A=2788&Q=385300.
193. See Milo Sheff et al. v. William A. O'Neill, et al. Phase II Comprehensive Management
Plan, Con Dep't of Educ. News (Conn. Dept. of Educ.), Jan. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.courant.com/niedia/acrobat/2009-02/44855273.pdf [hereinafter Phase I1
Plan 1.
194. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1329 (Borden,J., dissenting).
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remedial principles "in a timely, consistent, and effective manner."' 95 Thus,
"they have failed to provide legislatures, administrators, and lower courts
with clear, purposeful guidance.'
9
6
By focusing on educational outcomes, the sliding scale remedy ar-
ticulates a clear, intelligible principle that guides efforts to address racial,
ethnic, and economic isolation in schools. This will guide courts as they
enforce remedial orders and oversee progress of efforts to mitigate consti-
tutional violations. Because NCLB is all about frequent measurement of
academic outcomes, "the law is a boon to the construction of the 'judi-
cially manageable standards' that are so crucial to the adequacy
argument.',
9 7
Because the sliding scale remedy sets reasonable, objective progress
goals, courts will know when the use of additional equity power is or is
not appropriate in particular contexts. By incorporating outcomes-based
incentives into the remedy, the likelihood that remedies will simply throw
money at problems or integrate in ways that do not produce results will
be substantially reduced.'98
Courts are likely to defer to standards that are established by state
legislatures moving forward. Because its state legislature articulated clear
educational standards, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court said that
"the court will not substitute its judgment of what is 'suitable', but will
utilize as a base the standards enunciated by the legislature and the state
department of education.""' Although Connecticut courts have not yet
indicated that they will apply the Connecticut State Standards to its defi-
nition of an adequate education, the state legislature codified its state
standards and testing requirements into the statutory framework. 20 Other
states have similarly codified NCLB requirements into their own state
statutes.2" Thus, other courts could reasonably follow Kansas' lead.
In embracing the sliding scale remedy, however, courts will need to
consider standardized achievement scores to guide their remedies.-2
195. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1151.
196. Id.
197. Rudalevige, supra note 15, at 247-48.
198. See, e.g., HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 217-18 (indicating that school finance has
rarely been connected to incentives for improved student achievement, and that this has
led to bad policy outcomes).
199. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994).
200. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-14n (2009). According to the statute, "mastery testing
pursuant to this section shall be in conformance with the testing requirements of the No
Child Left Behind Act." See § 10-14n(g).
201. The Education Commission of the States has a No Child Left Behind Database
that lists the relevant NCLB implementation statutes of each states. See NCLB Database,
available at http://nclb2.ecs.org/NCLBSUPVEY/NCLB.aspx?Target=SS.
202. If courts are unwilling to do this, other, more holistic outcomes-based assess-
ments of educational opportunities could be considered to guide the remedy, but this
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Although such output measures have been considered to be "important
guideposts for determining whether an education system is functioning
well and whether further scrutiny is warranted, [] they are not seen as
constituent elements of a constitutional definition of adequacy.""2113 Courts
have hesitated to directly use high-stakes tests in their assessments of ade-
214quacy.
Assuming that courts fully adjudicate education lawsuits that chal-
lenge the racial, ethnic, and economic isolation of students, however,
applying high-stakes test results to the remedial phase of the litigation
would be quite beneficial from a separation of powers standpoint. Rather
than "strik[ing] down the system because the system strikes the court the
wrong way,... never ha[ving] to explain precisely why it is inadequate,
2
1
5
application of the sliding scale remedy will provide a clear rationale that
explains exactly why current, segregated conditions are problematic in a
particular school system. Legislatures will then know, both ex post and ex
ante, what they will need to accomplish over time to meet the standard.
This transparency will enhance predictability of future lawsuits. Mean-
while, state legislators know that they are in control of the state standards.
If they wish to modify those standards, they may do so, but they do so at
the risk of political fallout to their constituencies, who will demand high
standards of educational quality for their kids. If, for example, a legislature
and state board of education set high standards and immediately lowered
them after losing an adequacy lawsuit (the so-called "race to the bot-
tom"), both the local and national community are likely to react in a
negative way under a sliding scale remedy regime.
Finally, the sliding scale remedy will not force courts to decide on
an "optimal" racial or socioeconomic balance in a particular school dis-
trict or region. Indeed, the social science research has not thoroughly
addressed this question, and the only answers have emphasized that mi-
Note presumes that high-stakes state standardized tests or NAEP scores will guide courts'
implementation of the remedy.
203. See Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in ACHIEV-
ING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218, 242 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002).
204. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995)
("Performance levels on such examinations are helpful but should also be used cautiously
as there are a myriad of factors which have a causal bearing on test results."); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E. 2d 249,2590-60 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the "level of performance of the
children of the state and its various districts may be considered, but "they may not be
treated as absolutely authoritative on this issue.").
205. Joshua Dunn & Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation of Powers,
in SCHOOL MoNEY TRIALS:THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 322,333 (Mar-
tin R.West et al. eds., 2007).
206. Michael Heise implies that the race-to-the-bottom could adversely impact the
success of adequacy suits-and their remedies-moving forward. See Heise, supra note 14,
at 263 ("[O]ne unanticipated consequence of the interaction between adequacy litigation
and NCLB is the growing pressure on states to lower student proficiency standards so as to
reduce the state's exposure to adequacy litigation.").
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norities need to be present at more than a token percentage to ensure
positive outcomes.2"7 Beyond the practical difficulties of setting reasonable
racial balance targets, remedies that do not formally set these targets are
less likely to face Supreme Court scrutiny in the wake of decisions such as
Parents Involved. In this sense, a sliding scale remedy would receive less
constitutional scrutiny than the current Sheff remedy.
B. Maximizing the Court's Use of the Agenda Setting Power
The sliding scale remedy is designed to ensure that the court naxi-
mizes its agenda-setting power.There are two techniques that allow courts
to maximize this power. First, courts should make the outcomes of reform
clear to give the legislature a "meaningful target."'28" Such meaningful tar-
gets ensure that the legislature can clearly define its own progress towards
achieving outcomes and adjust its response as needed. Second, judges
should make use of meaningful and respectful deadlines.29 These deadlines
consistently reiterate the sense of urgency necessary to ensure that reme-
dial steps are taken. In addition, "[t]hreats of injunctive relief and retaining
jurisdiction over a lawsuit make these deadlines much more credible."211,
These agenda-setting criteria are met by the sliding scale remedy. In
the sliding scale remedy, the clear outcomes of reform are the educational
growth goals prescribed by the court, and the meaningful deadlines are
represented by the periodic checkpoints that ensure that those outcomes
are met. Meanwhile, the specter of injunctive relief-a regionalized
school district, for example-looms in the background.
This agenda-setting power will be particularly acute in the state court
decisions in which the sliding scale remedy is intended to apply. Although
federalism and separation of powers concerns may limit the degree to
which Article III courts impose remedial liability on the political concerns
of states, these concerns do not limit state courts.] Unlike federal court
decisions which limit debate and discussion at the state level, state-court
decisions promote democratic discussion amongst the political branches
and the people of a state. -12 State court judges are frequently viewed as "part
of the political process" since they frequently serve for limited terms, are
sometimes subject to recall elections, and are not insulated from political
207. See Black, supra note 149, at 963.
208. RED, supra note 10, at 171 ("By remaining focused on goals and outcomes,
without dictating means, judges simultaneously respect the policy-making authority of
legislators and executives and increase the likelihood that the legislature will take the deci-
sion seriously.").
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Hershkoff, supra note 118, at 1902.
212. Id.
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pressure.2 " Thus, "state court judges, free from the federalism constraints
that bind their Article III counterparts, are [] accorded a greater judicial
space in which to experiment and design innovative remedies . 2 " The
branches at the state level have blended and complementary functions.1 s
State courts thus have every right to set and guide the legislative agenda.
C. Focits on Students and Reduced Moral Hazard
One of the problems with past educational adequacy and desegrega-
tion lawsuits is that they have provided districts with resources without
ensuring that those school districts use them in ways that improve district
efficiency. Since money doled out in the political process is not tied to
educational outcomes, districts lack the incentives to place the resources
where they will ensure the best educational outcomes for our children.
This, for example, occurred in the Abbott districts of New Jersey, where
chronically failing districts were given almost "unlimited access to re-
sources and programs.' '211 It also occurred in the Kansas City schools that
were under the long-term remedial desegregation decrees that were chal-
lenged in Missouri v.Jenkins.2 7 Although schools in that district had been
under an eighteen-year desegregation order, student achievement in that
district was still "at or below national norms at many grade levels., 2 ' And,
although per-pupil expenditures in Kansas City were close to twice the
statewide average, performance on statewide tests did not improve relative
to peer school districts throughout the state .2 It is thus unsurprising that
few have documented increases in test scores that were a direct result of
education finance lawsuits.
2 "
213. Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalisin and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 459,472 (1996).
214. Hershkoff, supra note 118, at 1901.
215. Id. at 1904.
216. HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 223-24. Using an analysis of NAEP student
achievement data from 1992-2007, Hanushek found that "New Jersey students [were] still
in roughly the same position as an earlier generation of students in 1992." Id. at 165-66.
217. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). The Kansas City case is considered
the best-known anecdote regarding the inefficacy of increased educational funding. Ryan,
supra note 32, at 289 (1999).
218. 515 U.S. at 76. Although Missouri v.Jenkins ruled that student achievement was
not to be used as a gauge to determine the proper scope of the desegregation remedy, this
is solely because it was not relevant to the district's attainment of"partial unitary status." Id.
The primary goal of the remedy was to restore plaintifl to their ex ante position, not
equalize educational opportunities in accordance with a state constitution provision.
219. See Ryan, supra note 32, at 290.
220. See, e.g., HANUSHEK, supra note 13, at 146 ("Given the support adequacy litiga-
tion enjoys among professors in the nation's colleges of education, the absence of articles
documenting test scores rising in response to more funding is striking.").
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These problems have not arisen purely out of a lack of resources or
support from courts, but at least partially as a result of two related issues.
First, some school districts have lost sight of the fact that their purpose is
to serve students. Second, dependence on court ordered funding and
remedies has resulted in a moral hazard problem that has caused districts
to use their resources in inefficient ways.
Several case studies illustrate how urban districts have, at times, failed
to focus on their students.22 ' One case study of the Newark public
schools, for example, indicated that the school system places more impor-
tance on political connections than merit when appointing
administrators.222 Another in St. Louis concluded that "the St. Louis school
board has taken better care of many of its employees than it has of the
children whose life chances depend on the board's ability to lead. 2 23 Ad-
ditional studies of the Houston, Sacramento, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg
schools found that decision-making in the districts was often difficult due
to their political climate, and that "almost none [of the decision-making]
was focused on academic achievement."224
These anecdotes are strongly connected to the moral hazard prob-
lem commonly encountered in the insurance context. If we view
education remedies as insurance policies that are meant to protect against
inadequate educational opportunities, and the remedies are not time-
limited, the marginal cost of the remedy to school districts that receive
the benefits of the remedy is approximately zero. This marginal cost for
the district is far below the marginal social cost to the state when it pro-
vides the remedial benefit, and thus the urban district will use "too much"
of the remedial resources or engage in "too little care" with respect to
225
those resources.
To mitigate the moral hazard problem, the marginal "cost" of receiv-
ing the remedial benefit must be approximately equal to the marginal
benefits that are being provided.22 ' In the school remedy context, the
"cost" to the district can be viewed as the value-added achievement of
students that results from the school district's efforts.2 2 7 If value-added aca-
demic outputs are not commensurate with the benefits provided to the
221. See Ryan, supra note 32, at 294. See also JASON SNIPES ET AL., MDRC, FOUNDA-
TIONS FOR SUCCESS: CASE STUDIES OF How URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS IMPROVE STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT 27 (2002) (explaining that direct political influence was likely to affect hir-
ing decisions in the district), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/47/full.pdf.
222. See Ryan, supra note 32, at 294.
223. AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 130 (1997).
224. See SNIPES, supra note 221, at 21.
225. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 350 (2005).
226. Id. at 353.
227. Cf Rosalind Levacic, Funding Schools by Formula, in GOVERNANCE AND PERFORM-
ANCE OF EDUCATION SYSTEMS 205, 230 (Nils C. Soguel & Pierre Jaccard eds., 2007)
(discussing the moral hazard problem in the context of school funding formulas).
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district, inefficiencies may result. 2 ' Because the sliding scale remedy holds
districts in the entire region accountable to growth in academic achieve-
ment outcomes before exercising equity power, the sliding scale remedy
helps to reduce some of these moral hazard problems.
The sliding scale remedy also creates incentives for relevant political
actors to focus on students. If the student growth outcomes are not met
in the urban district, suburban districts understand that additional equity
power may be exercised against them. Thus, they have a strong incentive
to cooperate with urban districts over voluntary solutions.
Meanwhile, urban districts and state politicians understand the risks
of political backlash if they do not effectively work to improve the
achievement of students within the racially, ethnically, and economically
isolated districts. Because student achievement will be part of the court's
remedial analysis, an urban district's failure to improve achievement of stu-
dents who attend school within the district will be as transparent as the
district's failure to improve achievement for those students who opt for
open-choice or inter-district magnet programs. Thus, should the court be
forced to wield additional equity power as a result of an urban district's fail-
ure to effectively provide an education with the resources it has inside the
school district, state authorities-both of the executive and legislative
branches-will not allow the district to continue to operate in that manner.
For this reason, internal inefficiencies within urban school districts
are likely to lead to state takeovers or other measures by the state that will
stimulate efforts by political leaders to maximize the efficiency of the ur-
ban school district. If the state's efforts to improve efficiency within the
urban districts fail, this could simply support the claim that further efforts
to reduce racial, ethnic, and economic isolation are necessary to ensure
that efforts to improve academic achievement of urban students are suc-
cessful. This would legitimize increased equity power exercised by courts
under the sliding scale remedy.
It is worth reiterating that the sliding scale remedy focuses on the
achievement of suburban as well as urban students as it provides these in-
centives for reform. Even if some moral hazard were to occur within
urban school districts, there would not be significant "spillover" effects
into suburban school districts since suburban districts will not be enjoined
if their students are not achieving at high levels.
228. One of the inherent challenges with any remedy-whether it be a school fi-
nance or desegregation remedy-is that it is virtually impossible to isolate the value-added
effect of the school district on value-added outcomes. Id. However, using academic out-
comes to guide the remedy will at least ensure that the school district faces some "cost"
with respect to its value-added results.This is compared to the status quo, in which school
districts benefiting from remedies effectively face no such costs.
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CONCLUSION
I agree with Justice Marshall's statement that "unless our children
begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn
to live together. 2 29 The remedy I propose in this Note will move us one
step closer to that ideal. On the one hand, the remedy encourages states,
once and for all, to show that socioeconomic integration can equalize
outcomes-and therefore the opportunities-of socioecononically
isolated students. On the other hand, it also provides the states and local
school districts with the opportunity to show that voluntary remedies-
possibly those that promote little to no integration-can produce ade-
quate outcomes for low-income students.
This latter course may not seem to be a step in the right direction.
Either way, however, the remedy-if applied correctly-will show that
the academic achievement of both suburban and urban students is possi-
ble. In the long term, this will help dismantle many of the current
political and social barriers to integration. Not only will low-income
students' increased academic performance ultimately afford them greater
access to higher income neighborhoods, it will also convince many who
currently reside in such neighborhoods that learning in an integrated set-
ting is not as unfathomable as once thought. State constitutions can and
should pave the way for the fulfillment of the Sheff ideal2 "'-quality, inte-
grated schools for all children.
229. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 783 (1974) (Marshall,J, dissenting).
230. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) ("State constitutions ... are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.").
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